Quantitative Reasoning as a Cultural Construction

Many readers assume quantitative reasoning to be devoid of cultural bias. If an argument has statistical validity, it is reasoned, then it has (within a range of uncertainty) been verifiably demonstrated. Qualitative forms of reasoning, on the other hand, are sometimes deemed as suspect – as they are subject to the contingencies of human experience. In short, quantitative reasoning is seen as objective while qualitative reasoning is seen as subjective. If a range of experiences is seen as being objectively verifiable, it is thus, not cultural.

In so doing, one can run the risk of reifying a set of practices that has a deeply embedded cultural, social, economic, and political history. Mathematics, like all human practices, has a history. In the essay, "Western Mathematics: The Secret Weapon of Cultural Imperialism," Alan Bishop puts forth a compelling thesis that details the historical roots of western mathematics. He examines the ways in which the reification of western mathematics as a purely "objective" phenomenon has done the work of supporting western expansionism throughout colonial and post-colonial history (Bishop, Alan. Reprinted in The post-colonial Studies Reader, edited by Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. New York: Routledge, 1995: 71-76). He notes that "mathematics has somehow always been felt to be universal and, therefore, culture-free. It had in colonial times, and for most people it continues to have today, the status of a culturally neutral phenomenon in the otherwise turbulent waters of education and imperialism" (Bishop, qtd. In Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 71).

After all, as Hannah Arendt has noted in another context, the condition of two plus two equalling four is seen to be independent of the human condition (Arendt, "Understanding and Politics" in Arendt: Essays in Understanding). While this is undoubtedly true (mathematics in this sense can be seen to be universally valid), when we ask why two plus two equals four, the answer to this question is "because someone determined it should be that way" (Bishop, 71-2). There is nothing wrong with this, but it does elucidate the fact that mathematics has a cultural history. In other words, there may be other ways of enumerating, other ways of quantitatively reasoning and these rubrics and understandings of how the world is ordered can have a noticeable impact on how the world is viewed. Bishop writes:

"For example, we are now aware of the fact that many different counting systems exist in the world. In Papua New Guinea, Lean has documented nearly 600 (there are more than 750 languages there) containing various cycles of numbers, not all base ten…Nor is it only in number that we find interesting differences. The conception of space which underlies Euclidean geometry is also only one conception – it relies particularly on ‘atomistic’ and object-oriented ideas of points, lines, planes and solids. Other conceptions exist, such as that of the Navajos where space is neither subdivided nor objectified and everything is in motion" (emphasis our’s, 72).

By differently articulating a cultural conception of space, time, and measurement, relationships between individual and community, between self and other can be influenced – if not drastically altered from the ground up, so to speak. An atomized, objectified understanding of space may work in conjunction with similar ideas of self in society as well as property-rights. In other words, how we think about the world (including our history of quantitative reasoning) impacts how we act. Mathematics’ embeddedness in history is then socially, politically, and economically significant.

In placing mathematics in a cultural context, Bishop traces its relationship to western colonialism. He notes three major areas of influence: trade, administration (which is interesting but will not be addressed here), and education (73). In the first case, western measures and numbers (and western currency) was introduced – which in turn, reified western ideas of "length, area, volume, weight, time and money" in indigenous cultures (ibid.). In the latter case (education), Bishop again puts forth the interesting hypothesis that western educational practices naturalized western mathematics as being the valid and right way to enumerate phenomena. In so doing, indigenous populations "were educated away from their culture and away from their society…"(ibid.). Bishop assigns certain precepts affiliated with (western) mathematics and quantitative reasoning including rationalism, objectism, and mastery or control.

While one can debate at length about the merits of western mathematics its profound influence in colonial and postcolonial history cannot be doubted. In turning automatically in the direction of one form of quantitative reasoning, what ways of understanding the world might be eclipsed? It is important to recognize the cultural history of western mathematics and begin to think through other ways of literally "counting the world." In so doing, rich histories of human understanding may come to light – which could enable us to understand each other (and the world) more comprehensively. Moreover, the dangers of universal assumptions might be further elucidated by an historical perspective on western mathematics and quantitative reasoning.